III. INTERCONNECTION OF PSYCHICAL COMPOUNDS.
§ 15. CONSCIOUSNESS AND ATTENTION.


1. Every psychical compound is composed of a number of psychical elements which usually do not all begin or end at exactly the same moment. As a result, the interconnection which unites the elements into a single whole always reaches beyond the individual compounds, so that different simultaneous and successive compounds are united, though indeed somewhat more loosely than are the elements within a single compound. We call this interconnection of psychical processes consciousness.

Consciousness, accordingly, does not mean something which exists apart from psychical processes, nor does it refer merely to the sum of these processes without reference to how they are related to one another. It is the name for the general synthesis of mental processes, in which general synthesis the single compounds are marked off as more intimate combinations. A state in which this interconnection is interrupted, as deep sleep or a faint, is called an unconscious state; and we speak of "disturbances of consciousness" when abnormal changes in the combination of psychical compounds arise, even though the compounds themselves show no internal changes whatever.

2. Consciousness appears under the same external conditions as psychical phenomena in general. Indeed, consciousness is merely another name for these phenomena, referring more particularly to the mutual relations of the components of these phenomena to one another. As the substratum for the manifestations of an individual consciousness we have in every case an individual animal organism. In the case of men and similar higher animals the cerebral cortex, in the cells and fibers of which all the organs which stand in relation to psychical processes are represented, appears as the immediate organ of this consciousness. The complete interconnection of the cortical elements may be looked upon as the physiological correlate of the interconnection of psychical processes in consciousness, and the differentiation of the functions of different cortical regions, as the physiological correlate of the great variety of single conscious processes. The differentiation of functions in the central organs is, indeed, merely relative; every psychical compound requires the cooperation of numerous elements and of many central regions. When the destruction of certain cortical regions produces definite disturbances in voluntary movements and sensations, or when such a destruction interferes with the formation of certain classes of ideas, it is perfectly justifiable to conclude that these regions furnish certain indispensable links in the chain of physical processes which run parallel with the psychical processes in question. The assumption is often made on the. basis of these phenomena, that there is in the brain a special organ for the faculties of speech and writing, or that visual, tonal, and verbal ideas are stored in special cortial cells. Such an assumption is not only the result of the grossest physiological misconception, but it is irreconcilable with the psychological analysis of these functions. Psychologically regarded, this assumption is nothing but a modern revival of that most unfortunate form of faculty-psychology known as phrenology.

2a. The facts which have been discovered in regard to the localization of certain psycho-physical functions in the cortex, are derived partly from pathological and anatomical observations on men, and partly from experiments on animals. They may be summed up as follows: 1) Certain cortical regions correspond to certain peripheral sensory and muscular regions. Thus, the cortex of the occipital lobe is connected with the retina, a part of the parietal lobe is connected with the tactual surface, and a part of the temporal lobe with the auditory organ. The central ganglia of special groups of muscles generally lie directly next to, or between the sensory centers functionally related to them. 2) Certain complex disturbances have been demonstrated as occurring when certain cortical regions which are not directly connected with peripheral organs, but are inserted between other central regions, fail to carry out their functions. The only relation of this kind which has been proved beyond a doubt, is that of a certain region of the frontal lobe to the functions of speech. The front part of this region is connected in particular with the articulation of words (its disturbance results in interference with motor coordination, "ataxic aphasia"), the part further back is connected with the formation of word ideas (its disturbance hinders sensory coordination and produces in this way the so-called "amnesic aphasia"). It is also observed that these functions are as a rule confined entirely to the left frontal lobe and that generally apoplectic disturbances in the right lobe do not interfere with speech, while those in the left lobe do. Furthermore, in all these cases, in both simple and complex disturbances, there is usually a gradual restoration of the functions in the course of time. This is probably due to the vicarious functioning of some, generally a neighbouring, cortical region in place of that which is disturbed (in disturbances of speech, perhaps it is the opposite, before untrained, side which comes into play). Localization of other complex psychical functions, such as processes of memory and association, has not yet been demonstrated with certainty. The name "psychical centers", applied to certain cortical regions by many anatomists, is for the present at least based exclusively either on the very questionable interpretation of experiments on animals, or else on the mere anatomical fact that no motor or sensory fibers running directly to these regions can be found, and that in general connective fibers are here developed relatively late. The cortex of the frontal brain is such a region. In the human brain it is noticeable for its large development. It has been observed in many cases that disturbances in this part of the brain soon result in marked inability to concentrate the attention or in other intellectual defects which are possibly reducible to this; and from these observations the hypothesis has been made that this region is to be regarded as the seat of the function of apperception which will be discussed later (4), and of all those components of psychical experience in which, as in the feelings, the unitary interconnection of mental life finds its expression (comp. p. 101). This hypothesis requires, however, a firmer empirical foundation than it has at present. It is to be noted that certain cases in which a partial injury of the frontal lobe is sustained without any noticeable disturbance of intelligence, are by no means proofs against this hypothesis. There is much evidence to show that just here, in the higher centers, local injuries may occur without any apparent results. This is probably due to the great complexity of the connections and to the various ways in which the different elements can therefore take the places of one another. The expression "center" in all these cases is, of course, employed in the sense which is justified by the general relation of psychical to physical functions, that is, in the sense of a parallelism between the two classes of elementary processes, the one regarded from the point of view of the natural sciences, the other from that of psychology (comp. p. 2 and § 22, 9).

References. Hitzig, Untersuchungen über das Gehirn, 1874, Alte und neue Untersuchungen über das Gehirn, 1903. H. Munk, Ueber die Funktionen der Großhirnrinde, 1891. Luciani and Seppilli, Die Funktions-Lokalisation auf der Großhirnrinde, 1886. Flechsig, Gehirn und Seele, 2nd ed. 1896, Wundt, Phil. Stud., vol. 6, and Grundz. 5th ed., vol. I, Chap. 5; Lectures, lecture 30. On the Speech Center: Wundt, Völkerpsychologie, vol. I, Pt. I, chap. 5. Charlton Bastian, Ueber Aphasie und andere Sprachstörungen 1902.
 

3. The interconnection of psychical processes, which constitutes what we understand under the concept consciousness, is in part a simultaneous interconnection, in part a successive interconnection. The sum of all the processes present at a given moment is always a unitary whole the parts of which are more or less closely united. This is what constitutes the simultaneous interconnection. On the other hand, a present state is derived directly from that which immediately preceded it, in one of two ways. Either certain processes disappear and others change their course and still others arise, or else a state of unconsciousness intervenes and the new processes are brought into relation with those which were present before. These are what constitute successive interconnections. In all these cases the scope of the single combinations between preceding and following processes determines the state of consciousness. Consciousness gives place to unconsciousness when this interconnection is completely interrupted, and it is more incomplete the looser the connection between the processes of the moment and those preceding it. Thus, after a period of unconsciousness the normal state of consciousness is generally only slowly recovered through a gradual reestablishment of relations with earlier experiences.

So we come to distinguish grades of consciousness. The lower limit or zero grade is unconsciousness. This condition, which consists in an absolute absence of all psychical interconnections, is essentially different from the disappearance of single psychical contents from consciousness. The latter is continually taking place in the flow of mental processes. Complex ideas and feelings and even single elements of these compounds may disappear, and new ones take their places. Any psychical element which has disappeared from consciousness, is to be called unconscious in the sense that we assume the possibility of its renewal, that is, its reappearance in the actual interconnection of psychical processes. Our knowledge about an element which has become unconscious does not extend beyond this possibility of its renewal. For psychology, therefore, it has no meaning except as a disposition for the rise of future components of psychical processes, which components are connected with earlier conscious processes. Assumptions as to the state of the "unconscious" or as to "unconscious processes" of any kind which are thought of as existing along with the conscious processes of experience, are entirely unproductive for psychology. There are, of course, physical concomitants of the psychical dispositions mentioned, of which some can be directly demonstrated, some inferred from various experiences. These physical concomitants are the effects which practice produces on all organs, especially on the organs of the nervous system. As a universal result of practice we observe a facilitation of action which renders a repetition of the process easier. To be sure, we do not know any details in regard to the changes which are effected in the structure of the nervous elements through practice, but we can represent them to ourselves through very natural analogies with mechanical processes, such for example as the reduction of friction resulting from the rubbing of two surfaces against each other.

4. It was noted in the case of temporal ideas (p. 159), that the member of a series of successive ideas which is immediately present in our perception, has the most favorable position. Similarly in the simultaneous interconnection of consciousness, for example in a compound clang or in a series of spatial objects, certain single components are favored above the others. In both cases we designate the differences in the perception as differences in clearness and distinctness. Clearness is the relatively favorable recognition of the content in itself, distinctness the sharp discrimination of one content from others. Distinctness is generally connected with clearness. The state which accompanies the clear grasp of any psychical content and is characterized by a special feeling, we call attention. The process through which any content is brought to clear comprehension we call apperception. In contrast with this, perception of content which is not accompanied by a state of attention is designated apprehension. Those contents of consciousness upon which the attention is concentrated are spoken of, after the analogy of the external optical experiences of fixation, as being at the fixation-point of consciousness, or at the inner fixation-point. On the other hand, the whole content of consciousness at any given moment is called the field of consciousness. When a psychical process passes into an unconscious state we speak of its sinking below the threshold of consciousness, and when a psychical process arises we say it appears above the threshold of consciousness. These are all figurative expressions and must not be understood literally. They are useful, however, because of the brevity and clearness which they permit in the description of conscious processes.

5. If we try to describe the train of psychical compounds in their interconnection, with the aid of these expressions, we may say that this train of compounds is made up of a continual coming and going. At first some compound comes into the field of consciousness and then advances into the inner fixation-point, from which it returns to the field of consciousness before disappearing entirely. Besides this train of psychical compounds all of which are apperceived, there is also a coming and going of other compounds which are merely apprehended, that is, there are compounds which enter the field of consciousness and pass out again without reaching the inner fixation-point. Both the apperceived and the apprehended compounds may have different grades of clearness. In the case of apperceived compounds this appears in the fact that the clearness and distinctness of apperception in general is variable according to the state of consciousness. To illustrate, it can easily be shown that when one and the same impression is apperceived several times in succession, if the other conditions remain the same, the successive apperceptions are usually clearer and more distinct. The different degrees of clearness in the case of compounds which are merely apprehended, may be observed most easily when the impressions are composite. It is then found, especially when the impressions last but an instant, that even here, where all the components are obscure from the first, there are still different gradations. Some seem to rise more above the threshold of consciousness, some less.

6. These relations can not be determined with certainty through chance introspections, they require systematic experimental observations. The best kinds of conscious contents to use for such observations are ideas because they can easily be produced at any time through external stimuli, which stimuli may furthermore be of such short duration that the content of consciousness which is present at the moment of stimulation will be clearly distinguishable from the contents of consciousness which precede and follow the impression. Such conditions make introspective analysis possible, for in any temporal idea, as already remarked (§ II, p. 171), those components which belong to the present moment are in the fixation-point of consciousness. Those of the preceding impressions which were present shortly before, are still in the field of consciousness, while those which were present longer before, have disappeared from consciousness entirely. A spatial idea, on the other hand, can be apperceived at once in its totality only when it is limited in extent. If it is more composite, then its parts must also pass successively through the inner fixation-point if they are to be clearly perceived. It follows, therefore, that composite spatial ideas (especially momentary visual impressions) are peculiarly well suited to furnish a measure of the amount of content which can be apperceived in a single act, or of the scope of attention; while composite temporal ideas (for example, regular series of auditory impressions, hammer-strokes) may be more easily used for measuring the amount of interrelated content that can enter into consciousness at a given moment, or the scope of consciousness for complex ideas. Since a number of successive impressions, when this number is small, can be immediately comprehended by the attention as a single simultaneous whole, a determination of the range of attention can easily be made in connection with time ideas, especially auditory time ideas which are aroused under favorable conditions through the adoption of a sequence of suitable rapidity. Experiments which are carried out in this way show that the range of attention is very constant even under changing conditions. A maximum range of six simple sensations is found to hold for attention. The scope of consciousness, as defined above, is such that from six to forty simple impressions may be included, according as the complexity and mode of sub-division of the total presentation is varied.

6a. The determination of the scope of attention can be made by using spatial impressions of sight, either illuminating the field for a brief interval by means of an electric spark, or else exposing the field by means of the fall of a screen made with an opening in the center. Such an apparatus is known as a tachistoscope. In these experiments there must be, before the momentary illumination, a point for fixation in the middle of the surface on which the impressions are to appear. Immediately after the experiment, if it is properly arranged, the observer knows that the number of objects which were clearly seen in a physiological sense, is greater than the number included within the scope of attention. When for example a momentary impression is made up of letters, it is possible, by calling up a memory image of the impression, to read afterwards some of the letters which were only indistinctly recognized at the moment of illumination. This memory image, however, is clearly distinguished in time from the impression itself, so that the determination of the scope of attention is not disturbed by it. It is true, rather, that careful introspection easily succeeds in fixating the state of consciousness at the moment the impression arrives, and in distinguishing this from the subsequent acts of memory, which are always separated from it by a noticeable interval. These experiments, as well as the analogous experiments which are carried on with successive auditory impressions, show that the scope of attention, when it is kept at its maximum intensity, remains constant only when the impressions are held apart as in the case of isolated lines, numbers, letters, and beats which have no rhythmical character. As soon as the impressions are bound together in complexes the number included in the scope of attention changes. For touch the same limit of six seems to hold in the case of the simplest impressions, namely, points. Six such simple impressions can, under favorable conditions, be apperceived in the same instant. This fact has been made use of in a practical way in the blind alphabet made with points (p. 118). For both touch and vision the number of familiar ideas that can be grasped at once decreases as the complexity increases. In such cases, however, it should be noted that the total number of elements increases in spite of the decrease in the number of separate total ideas. Thus, when nonsense syllables are used, from six to ten letters can be apperceived at once. Familiar phrases and proverbs may appear to be apperceived in a much more extensive way. Indeed, sometimes apperception seems to include four or five short words with a total of twenty or thirty letters. In these cases, however, the process of apperception is decidedly complicated by the fact that assimilation (which will be discussed in § 16) makes itself felt in a very marked degree, so that such experiments are worthless for the determination of the scope of attention. If assimilation is checked by a closer concentration of the attention upon the impression itself, the scope of attention is again reduced even for these familiar groups of words to about the same limits as those which appear in the case of separate impressions. Another group of conditions under which the scope of attention seems to be much enlarged is the group of conditions presented when impressions are given for a relatively longer period of time, so that the attention finds opportunity to pass from point to point, thus approximating the conditions which arise in ordinary reading. If, however, these complications of successive observation, and the above mentioned complications of reproductive association, are all eliminated, the maximum scope of attention for both vision and touch seems to be expressed by the figures given at first. The scope of attention includes from four to six simple impressions. Under any conditions, then, the assertion which has sometimes been made that attention can be concentrated on only one impression, or one idea at a time, is false.

Then too, the observations overthrow the assumption that the attention can sweep continuously and with great rapidity over a great number of single ideas. In the experiment described, if the attempt is made to fill up from memory the image which is clearly perceived an instant after the impression, a very noticeable interval is required to bring into clear consciousness an impression which was not apperceived at first. The successive movement of attention over a number of objects appears accordingly, to be a periodic process, made up of a number of separate acts of apperception following one another. Such a periodic rise and fall of attention can, under favorable conditions, be directly demonstrated. It is generally irregular in its periods, but when there are special conditions favoring rhythmical succession the periods may become regular. Thus, if we allow a weak continuous impression to act on a sense organ and remove as far as possible all other stimuli, it will be observed when the attention is concentrated upon this impression that at certain, generally irregular, intervals, the impression becomes for a short time indistinct, or even appears to fade out entirely, only to appear again the next moment. This wavering begins, when the impressions are very weak, after 3—6 seconds; when they are somewhat stronger, after 18—24 seconds. These variations are readily distinguished from changes in the intensity of the stimulus itself, as may be easily demonstrated by purposely weakening or interrupting the stimulus in the course of the experiment. There are two characteristics which distinguish the subjective variations from those due to the changes in the stimulus. First, so long as the impression merely passes through subjective variations there is always an idea of the continuance of the impression, just as there was in the experiments with momentary impressions an indefinite and obscure idea of the components which were not apperceived. Second, the oscillations of attention are attended by characteristic feelings and sensations which are added to the increasing and decreasing clearness of the impressions, and which are entirely absent when the changes are objective. The characteristic feelings are those of expectation and activity, which will be described later and which regularly increase with the concentration of attention and decrease with its relaxation. The sensations come from the sense-organ affected, or at least emanate indirectly from it. They consist in sensations of tension in the tympanic membrane or in sensations of accommodation and convergence, etc. These two series of characteristics distinguish the concepts, clearness and distinctness of psychical contents from the concept intensity of sensation elements. A strong impression may be obscure and a weak one clear. The only relation between these two different concepts is to be found in the fact that in general the stronger impressions force themselves more upon apperception. Whether or not they are really more clearly apperceived, depends on the other conditions present at the moment. The same is true of the advantages possessed by those parts of a visual impression which fall within the region of clearest vision. As a rule, the fixated objects are also the ones apperceived. But, in the experiments with momentary impressions described above, it can be shown that this interconnection may be broken up. This happens when we voluntarily concentrate our attention on a point in the eccentric regions of the field of vision. The object which is obscurely seen then becomes the one which is clearly ideated.

6b. The most direct method of measuring the scope of consciousness for a regularly divided complex group of impressions consists in presenting to an observer a series of beats which succeed each other at equal intervals and contain certain rhythmical accents. In this case we start with the assumption that a series of impressions can be united in a single unitary idea only when they are all together in consciousness, at least for one moment. If we listen to a series of hammer-strokes, it is obvious that while the present sound is apperceived, those immediately preceding it are partly in the focus of attention or at least partly in the field of consciousness. Their clearness diminishes, however, just in proportion to their distance in time from the apperceived impression, and those lying beyond a certain limit disappear from consciousness entirely. If we can determine this limit, we shall have a measure of the relative scope of consciousness under the given conditions. As a means for the determination of this limit we may use the ability to compare ideas which follow one another immediately. So long as such a more or less complex idea is present in consciousness as a single unitary whole, we can compare a succeeding idea with it and decide whether the two are alike or not. On the other hand, such a comparison is absolutely impossible when the preceding temporal series is not a unitary whole for consciousness, that is, when a part of its constituents have passed into unconsciousness before the end is reached. For this purpose we have only to present two successive series of beats which are defined by giving a signal at the beginning of each series, by means for example of the sound of a bell. For the production of such a series of beats one may use a simple metronome, or one can use an especially constructed apparatus which makes it possible to overcome altogether the defect which usually appears in the metronome in the inequality of intensity in the beats. When now, these two series are perceived, we can judge directly from the impression, so long as the strokes of the given series can be grasped as single wholes in consciousness, whether the two series are alike or not. Of course, in such experiments counting of the strokes must be strictly avoided. In making the judgments it may be noticed that the impression of likeness is produced by the same affective elements as in the temporal ideas mentioned before (p. 173). Every stroke in the second series is preceded by a feeling of expectation corresponding to the analogous stroke of the first series, so that a series which contains an excessive or too limited number of beats produces a disturbance of the expectation with its accompanying feeling of disappointment. It follows that it is not necessary for the two successive series to be present in consciousness at the same time in order that they may be compared; but what is required is the union of all the impressions of one series into a single unitary idea. The relatively fixed boundary of the scope of consciousness is clearly shown in the fact that the equality of two temporal ideas is always recognized with certainty so long as these ideas do not pass the bounds which hold for the conditions under which they are given, while the judgment becomes absolutely uncertain when these bounds are once crossed. The extent of the scope of consciousness as found in measurements made when the conditions of attention remain the same, depends partly on the rate of the successive impressions and partly on their more or less complete rhythmical combination and division. When the rate of succession is slower than about one every four seconds, it becomes impossible to combine successive impressions into a temporal idea; by the time a new impression arrives, the preceding one has already disappeared from consciousness. When the rate passes the upper limit of about one every 0.12 sec., the formation of distinctly defined temporal ideas is impossible because the attention can not follow the impressions any longer. The most favorable rate is a medium succession of strokes, one every 0.2—0.3 sec.

When a series of unaccented impressions comes at a uniform rate of speed, the number which can be immediately comprehended as a single unit and can be compared with a subsequent series is six. This number corresponds exactly to the number of visual impressions which were found to be included within the limits of the scope of attention. The following diagram represents the increase in the scope of consciousness when the impressions are divided into rhythmical groups in two of the simplest cases of 2/8 and 2/4 time.

LIMIT OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

The largest number of impressions which can be included in any commonly attainable range of consciousness is secured by using five successive feet of 4/4 beats. The total number in this case is five times eight or forty impressions. This upper limit is very dependent upon practice. If we consider each complex as a single factor, the upper limit never exceeds six. The range of consciousness is, accordingly, the same for simple unrelated impressions as is the range of attention. For regularly grouped complexes, on the other hand, the complex units fall as a rule under the number six, while the total number of simple impressions which are included in this reduced number of groups is greater. At about 6/4 time a limit of grouping is reached which can not be passed. This scope of consciousness for complex groups of presentations is not to be confused with the absolute range of consciousness. In the absolute range of consciousness there are always feelings in addition to impressions, and there are besides these, certain other isolated ideational contents present. This explains the fact that in an unrelated series of impressions the range of consciousness and the range of attention coincide. In such a case as this, as soon as an impression leaves the focus of attention it disappears in the mass of other unrelated contents which lie in the outer ranges of the field of consciousness. For these impressions in the periphery of consciousness there is, of course, no possibility of making any definite determination since they are not included within the scope of apperceived contents. If, however, these elements which have passed out of the focus of consciousness, remain connected in any wise with the elements which are apperceived, they remain still in consciousness even though they are somewhat obscure.

Just as the scope of consciousness becomes identical with the scope of attention when we are dealing with unrelated successive impressions, so the determination of the scope of consciousness can be worked out with the simultaneous impressions of visual objects which were used for the determination of the range of attention. These simultaneous visual impressions can be used to determine the range of attention if presented only once; they can be used for the study of consciousness in general when a succession of instantaneous visual impressions of complex character are allowed to follow each other at appropriate intervals. In the latter type of cases the parts of the objects which are seen indirectly are, as a rule, also those which are vaguely apprehended in consciousness. The contents which are thus unapperceived, but which are at the same time included in the scope of consciousness, will be recognized by the fact that as soon as any one of these is modified in the successive presentations, the total character of the image will be recognized as no longer the same, but it will be quite impossible to give any definite account of the exact character of the change which has taken place. Exact accounts of the changes can be given only when these changes fall within the scope of attention. The successive complex visual images are related to each other very much as the successive beats in that part of the diagram which represents the 2/4 beats would be related if in the second succession a single beat were omitted or one were added to the series. Experiments carried out according to this method show that, as in the scope of attention, so also in the total scope of consciousness, about the same number of impressions can be included as in the experiments with rhythmical beats. We may thus assume that here also we are dealing with general characteristics of consciousness and not with special conditions related to a single group of sensations.

References. On the Scope of Attention: Cattell, Phil. Stud., vol. 3. Zeitler, Phil. Stud., vol. 16. On Fluctuation of Attention: N. Lange, Phil. Stud., vol. 4. Eckner, pace, Phil. Stud., vol. 8. On the scope of consciousness: Dietze, Phil. Stud., vol. 2. Wirth, Phil. Stud., vol. 20. Quandt, Psychol. Stud., vol. 1. Wundt, Grundz. 5th ed., vol. Ill, Chap. 18; Lectures, lectures 16 and 17.

7. Besides the properties of clearness and distinctness which belong to conscious contents in themselves or in their mutual relations to one another, there are regularly other properties which are immediately recognized as accompanying processes. These are partly feelings which are characteristic of particular forms of apprehension and apperception, partly sensations of a somewhat variable character. Especially the entrance of psychical contents into the field and focus of consciousness will vary according to the different conditions under which the entrance takes place. When any psychical process rises above the threshold of consciousness, it is the affective elements which, as soon as they are strong enough, first become noticeable. They begin to force themselves energetically into the fixation-point of consciousness before anything is perceived of the ideational elements. This is the case whether the impressions are new or are revivals of earlier processes. This is what causes those peculiar states of mind the reasons for which we are usually unable to discover. They are sometimes states of a pleasurable or unpleasurable character, sometimes they are predominantly states of strained expectation. In this latter case the sudden entrance into the scope of the attention of the ideational elements belonging to the feelings, is accompanied by feelings of relief or satisfaction. When we are trying to recall something that has been forgotten, this affective state may arise. Often there is vividly present in such a case, besides the regular feeling of strain, the special affective tone of the forgotten idea, although the idea itself still remains in the background of consciousness. In a similar manner, as we shall see later (§ 16), the clear apperception of ideas in acts of cognition and recognition is always preceded by special feelings. Similar affective states may be produced experimentally by the momentary illumination of a field of vision in which there are in the region of indirect vision, impressions of the strongest possible affective tone. All these experiences seem to show that every content of consciousness has some influence on attention. Every content thus shows itself partly through its own proper affective tone, and partly through the feelings connected with acts of attention. The whole effect of these obscure contents of consciousness on the attention fuses, according to the general law of the synthesis of affective components (p. 177), with the feelings attending the clearly conscious contents, thus forming a single total feeling.

8. When any psychical content enters the fixation-point of consciousness, new and peculiar affective processes are added to those which have been described. These new feelings are in turn of different kinds, according to the different conditions attending the entrance of the content into the fixation-point. The conditions are of two classes and are related for the most part, to the above described preparatory affective influences of the content before it is apperceived.

First, the new content may force itself on the attention suddenly and without preparatory affective influences; this we call spontaneous or passive apperception. While the content of consciousness is becoming clearer both in its ideational and affective elements, there is first of all a concomitant feeling of passive receptivity, which is a depressing feeling, and is generally stronger the more intense the psychical process, and the more rapid its rise. This feeling soon sinks and then gives place to an antagonistic, exciting feeling of activity. There are connected with both these feelings characteristic sensations in the muscles of the sense-organ from which the ideational components of the process proceed. The feeling of receptivity is accompanied by a transient sensation of relaxation, that of activity by a succeeding sensation of strain.

Second, the new content may be preceded by the preparatory affective influences mentioned above (7), and as a result the attention may be concentrated upon this content even before it arrives; this we call predetermined or active apperception. In such a case the apperception of the content is preceded by a feeling of expectation, sometimes of longer, sometimes of shorter duration. This feeling is generally one of strain and may at the same time be one of excitement; it may also have pleasurable or unpleasurable factors, according to its ideational elements. This feeling of expectation is usually accompanied by fairly intense sensations of tension in the muscles of the sense-organ affected. At the moment in which the content arises in clear consciousness, this feeling gives place to a feeling of fulfillment which is generally very short and has the character of a feeling of relief. Under circumstances it may also be quieting or exciting, pleasurable or unpleasurable. After this feeling of fulfillment, we have at once the feeling of activity. This is the same feeling as that which appeared at the close of passive apperception, and is here, as it was there, attended by an increase in the feelings of strain.

8a. The experimental observation of the different forms of apperception can be carried on best with the aid of the reaction experiments described in § 14. Passive apperception may be studied by the use of unexpected impressions, and active, by the use of expected impressions. At the same time it will be observed that between these typical differences there are intermediate stages. Either the passive form will approach the active because of the weakness of the first stage, or the active will approach the passive form because in the sudden relaxation of the expectation the contrast between the expectation and the relief and depression which come in the succeeding feeling of fulfillment, is more marked than usual. The expressions "passive" and "active" indicate, accordingly, not so much opposite processes as special limits between which there are all possible intermediate stages. As the individual cases approach one limit or the other we classify them under the same categories as the extreme cases. Furthermore, these expressions, as the above discussion shows, refer not immediately to the process of apperception itself, which is essentially the same in all cases, but rather to the total state of consciousness. When used in this sense, the phrase "passive apperception" is nothing but an abbreviation for the full expression, "apperception preceded by a conscious state which up to the moment of apperception is to be defined as passive".

9. If the affective side of these processes of attention is more closely examined, it appears that the affective elements are exactly the same as in the case of all volitional processes. It is also clear that in its essential character passive apperception corresponds to an impulsive act while the active form of apperception corresponds to a voluntary act. In the first case the psychical content which forces itself upon attention without preparation is evidently the single motive, and therefore arouses the act of apperception without any conflict with other motives. The act is here too connected with the feeling of activity characteristic of all volitional acts. In the case of active apperception, on the other hand, other psychical contents with their affective elements tend to force themselves upon the attention during the preparatory affective stages, so that the act of apperception when it is finally performed is often recognized as a voluntary process. It may even be recognized as a selective process when the conflict between different contents comes clearly into consciousness. The existence of such selective acts under the circumstances mentioned was recognized even in older psychology where "voluntary attention" was spoken of. But here too, as in the case of external volitional acts, "will" was made to stand alone; there was no explanation of it by its antecedents, because the central point in the development, namely the fact that so-called involuntary attention is only a simpler form of internal volition, was entirely overlooked. Then, too, in accordance with the methods of the old faculty-theory, "attention" and "will" were regarded as different, sometimes as related forces, sometimes as mutually excluding psychical forces, while the truth evidently is that these two concepts refer to the same class of psychical processes.

10. In connection with these internal volitional acts which we call processes of attention, there takes place the formation of certain concepts of the highest importance for all psychical development. This is the formation of the concept subject and the establishment of the correlate concept objects, as independent realities standing over against the subject. The full formation of these concepts can be carried out in logical form only with the aid of scientific reflection, still the concepts have their origin in the processes of attention.

Even in immediate experience there is a division between components of this experience. On the one hand are those components which are arranged in space with relation to the point of orientation mentioned above (p. 146), and are either called objects, that is, something outside the perceiving subject, or are called with reference to the mode of their rise in consciousness, ideas, that is, something which the subject perceives. On the other hand, there are other components of experience which do not belong to this spatial order, though they are continually brought into relation with it through their quality and intensity. These latter components as we saw in §§ 12—14, are intimately interconnected. Feelings are parts of emotions and emotions are to be considered as components of volitional processes. Any such process may end before it is fully completed, as is often the case when a feeling gives rise to no noticeable emotion, or when an emotion fades out without really causing the volitional act for which it prepared the way. All affective processes may, then, be subsumed under the general concept volitional process. Volition is the complete process of which the other two are merely components of simpler or more complex character. From this point of view we can easily understand how it is that even simple feelings contain, in the extremes between which they vary, a volitional direction; that these same feelings express by their tendencies the amount of volitional energy present at a given moment; and finally, that they correspond to certain particular phases of the volitional process itself. The direction of volition is obviously indicated by the pleasurable or unpleasurable directions of feelings, which correspond directly to an effort to reach something, or to an effort to avoid something. The amount of volitional energy finds its expression in the arousing and subduing directions of feelings, while the opposite phases of a volitional process are related to the directions of strain and relaxation.

11. Thus, volition proves to be the fundamental fact from which arise all those processes which are made up of feelings. In the process of apperception, which is found through psychological analysis to have all the characteristics of a volitional act, we have the direct relation between this fundamental fact of volition and the ideational contents of experience. Volitional processes are furthermore recognized as being unitary processes and as being uniform in character in the midst of all the variations in their components. As a result there arises an immediate feeling of this unitary interconnection in connection with the feeling of activity which accompanies all volition. This feeling of unity is then carried over to all conscious contents because of the relation mentioned, in which these conscious contents stand to volition. This feeling of the interconnection of all psychical experiences of an individual, is called the "ego". It is a feeling, not an idea as it is often called. Like all feelings, however, it is connected with certain sensations and ideas. The ideational components most closely related to the ego are the common sensations and the idea of one's own body.

That part of the affective and ideational contents which detaches itself from the totality of consciousness and fuses with the feeling of the ego, is called self-consciousness. It is no more a reality, apart from the processes of which it is made up, than is consciousness in general. It is merely a name for the interconnection of these processes, which furthermore, especially in their ideational components, can never be sharply distinguished from the rest of consciousness. This shows itself most of all in the facts that the idea of one's own body sometimes fuses with the feeling of the ego, sometimes is distinct from this feeling as an idea of an object, and that in general self-consciousness in its development always tends to reduce itself to its affective basis.

12. This separation of self-consciousness from the other contents of consciousness also gives rise to the discrimination of subject and objects. The concept subject has, accordingly, as a result of its psychological development three different meanings of different scope, each of which may at different times be the one employed. In its narrowest sense the subject is the interconnection of volitional processes, which interconnection finds expression in the feeling of the ego. In the next wider sense it includes the real content of these volitional processes together with the feelings and emotions which prepare their way. Finally, in its widest significance it embraces the constant ideational substratum of these subjective processes, that is, the body of the individual as the seat of the common sensations. In the line of development the widest significance is the oldest, and in actual psychical experience the narrowest is continually giving way to a return to one of the others, because the narrowest form can be fully attained only through conceptual abstraction. This highest form is, then, in reality merely a kind of limit toward which self-consciousness may approach more or less closely.

12a. This discrimination of subject and objects, or of the ego and the outer world as it is commonly expressed by reducing the first concept to its original affective substratum and gathering the second together in a general concept — this discrimination is the basis of all the considerations responsible for the dualism which first gained currency in the popular view of things and was then carried over into philosophical systems. It is on this ground that psychology comes to be set over against the other sciences, in particular the natural sciences, as a science of the subject (§ 1, p. 4). Such a view could be correct only under the conditions that the discrimination of the ego from the outer world were a fact preceding all experience and that the concepts subject and objects could be unequi vocally distinguished once for all. But neither of these conditions is fulfilled. Self-consciousness depends on a whole series of psychical processes of which it is the product, not the producer. Subject and object are, therefore, neither originally, nor in later development, absolutely different contents of experience. They are concepts which are due to reflection and they result from the interrelations of the various components of the absolutely unitary content of our immediate experience.

References. Staude, Der Begriff der Apperception in der neueren Psychologie, Phil. Stud., vol. 1. Külpe, Die Lehre vom Willen in der neueren Psychologie, Phil. Stud., vol. 5. Wundt Grundz. 5th ed., vol. Ill, Chap. 18; Lectures, ecture 17; System der Philosophie 2nd ed. Section II.
 

13. The interconnection of psychical processes which makes up consciousness, has its deepest spring in the processes of combination which are continually taking place between the elements of the single contents of experience. Such processes are operative in the formation of single psychical compounds and they are what give rise to the simultaneous unity of the state of consciousness present at a given moment and also to the continuity of successive states. These processes of combination are of the most various kinds; each one has its individual coloring, which is never exactly reproduced in any second case. Still, the most general differences are those exhibited by attention in the passive reception of impressions and the active apperception of impressions. As short names for these differences we use the term association to indicate a process of combination in a passive state of attention, and the term apperceptive combination to indicate a combination in which the attention is active.