1. Every emotion, made up, as it is, of a unified series of interrelated affective processes, may terminate in one of two ways. It may give place to the ordinary, variable, and relatively unemotional course of feelings. Such affective processes which fade out without any special result, constitute the emotions in the strict sense, such as were discussed in the last paragraph. In a second class of cases the emotional process may pass into a sudden change in ideational and affective content, which brings the emotion to an instantaneous close; such changes in the sensation and affective state which are prepared for by an emotion and bring about its sudden end, are called volitional acts. The emotion together with its result is a volitional process.

A volitional process in thus related to an emotion as a process of a higher stage, in the same way that an emotion is related to a feeling. Volitional act is the name of only one part of the process, that part which distinguishes a volition from an emotion. The way for the development of volitions out of emotions is prepared by those emotions in connection with which external pantomimetic expressive movements (p. 191) appear. These expressive movements appear chiefly at the end of the process and generally hasten its completion; this is especially true of anger, but to some extent also of joy, care, etc. Still, in these mere emotions there is an entire absence of changes in the train of ideas, which changes are the immediate causes of the momentary transformation of the emotion into volitions, and are also accompanied by characteristic feelings.

This close interconnection of volitional acts with panto-mimetic expressive movements necessarily leads us to consider as the earliest stages of volitional development those volitions which end in certain bodily movements, which are in turn due to the preceding train of ideas and feelings. In other words, we come to look upon volition ending in external volitional acts, as the earliest stages in the development of volitions. The so-called internal volitional acts, on the other hand, or those which close simply with effects on ideas and feelings, appear in every case to be products of later development.

2. A volitional process which passes into an external act may be defined as an emotion which closes with a pantomimetic movement and has, in addition to the characteristics belonging to all such movements, the special property of producing an external effect which removes the emotion itself. Such an effect is not possible for all emotions, but only for those in which the very succession of component feelings produces feelings and ideas which are able to remove the preceding emotion. This is, of course, most commonly the case when the final result of the emotion is the direct opposite of the preceding feelings. The fundamental psychological condition for volitional acts is, therefore, the contrast between feelings, and the origin of the first volitions is most probably in all cases to be traced back to unpleasurable feelings which arouse external movements, which in turn produce contrasted pleasurable feelings. The seizing of food to remove hunger, the struggle against enemies to appease the feeling of revenge, and other similar processes are original volitional processes of this kind. The emotions coming from sense-feelings, and the most widespread social emotions such as love, hate, anger, and revenge, are thus, both in men and animals, the common origin of will. A volition is distinguished in such cases from an emotion only by the fact that the former has added to its emotional components an external act that gives rise to feelings which, through contrast with the feelings contained in the emotion, bring the emotion itself to an end. The execution of the volitional act may then lead directly, as was originally always the case, or indirectly through an emotion of contrasted affective content, into the ordinary quiet flow of feelings.

3. The richer the ideational and affective contents of experience, the greater the variety of the emotions and the wider the sphere of volitions. There is no feeling or emotion which does not in some way prepare for a volitional act, or at least have some part in such a preparation. All feelings, even those of a relatively indifferent character, contain in some degree an effort towards or away from some end. This effort may be very general and aimed merely at the maintenance or removal of the present affective state. While volition appears as the most complex form of affective process, presupposing feelings and emotions as its components, still, we must not overlook, on the other hand, the fact that single feelings continually appear which do not unite to form emotions, and emotions appear which do not end in volitional acts. In the total interconnection of psychical processes, however, these three stages are conditions of one another and form the related parts of a single process which is complete only when it becomes a volition. In this sense a feeling may be thought of as the beginning of a volition, or a volition may be thought of as a composite affective process, and an emotion may be regarded as an intermediate stage between the two.

4. The single feelings in an emotion which closes with a volitional act are usually far from being of equal importance. Certain ones among them, together with their related ideas, are prominent as those which are most important in preparing for the act. Those combinations of ideas and feelings which in our subjective consciousness are the immediate antecedents of the act, are called motives of volition. Every motive may be divided into an ideational and an affective component. The first we may call the moving reason, the second the impelling feeling of action. When a beast of prey seizes his victim, the moving reason is the sight of the victim, the impelling feeling may be either the unpleasurable feeling of hunger or the race-hate aroused by the sight. The reason for a criminal murder may be theft, removal of an enemy, or some such idea, the impelling feeling the feeling of want, hate, revenge, or envy.

When the emotions are of composite character, the reasons and impelling feelings are mixed, often to so great an extent that it would be difficult for the author of the act himself to decide which was the leading motive. This is due to the fact that the impelling feelings of a volitional act combine, just as the elements of a composite feelings do, to form a unitary whole in which all other impulses are subordinated to a single predominating one; the feelings of like direction strengthening and accelerating the effect, those of opposite direction weakening it. In the combinations of ideas and feelings which we call motives, the final weight of importance in preparing for the act of will belongs to the feelings, that is, to the impelling feelings rather than to the ideas. This follows from the very fact that feelings are integral components of the volitional process itself, while the ideas are of influence only indirectly, through their connections with the feelings. The assumption that a volition may arise from pure intellectual considerations, or that a decision may appear which is opposed to the inclinations expressed in the feelings, is a psychological contradiction in itself. It rests upon the abstract concept of a will which is transcendental and absolutely distinct from actual psychical volitions. The combination of a number of motives, that is, the combination of a number of ideas and feelings which stand out from the composite train of emotions to which they belong as the ideas and feelings which determine the final discharge of the act — this combination furnished the essential condition for the development of will, and also for the discrimination of the single forms of volitional action.

5. The simplest case of volition is that in which a single feeling in an emotion of suitable constitution, together with its accompanying idea, becomes a motive and brings the process to a close through an appropriate external movement. Such volitional processes determined by a single motive, may be called simple volitions. The movements in which they terminate are designated impulsive acts. In popular parlance, however, this definition of impulse by the simplicity of the motive, is not sufficiently adhered to. Another element, namely, the character of the feeling that acts as impelling force is, in popular thought, usually brought into the definition. All acts that are determined by sense-feelings, especially common feelings, are generally called impulsive acts without regard to whether a single motive or a plurality of motives is operative. This basis of discrimination is psychologically inappropriate and there is no justification for the complete separation to which it naturally leads between impulsive acts and volitional acts as specifically distinct kinds of psychical processes.

By impulsive act, then, we mean a simple volitional act, that is, one resulting from a single motive, without reference to the relative position of this motive in the series of affective and ideational processes. Impulsive action, thus defined, must necessarily be the starting point for the development of all volitional acts, even though it may continue to appear later, along with the complex volitional processes. To be sure, the earliest impulsive acts are those which come from sense-feeling. Thus, most of the acts of animals are impulsive, but such impulsive acts appear continually in the case of man, partly as the results of simple sense emotions, partly as the products of the habitual execution of certain volitional acts which were originally determined by complex motives (10).

6. When several feelings and ideas in the same emotion tend to produce external action, and when those components of an emotional train which have become motives tend at the same time toward different external ends, whether related or antagonistic, then there arises out of the simple act a complex volitional process. In order to distinguish this from a simple volitional act, or impulsive act, we call it a voluntary act.

Voluntary and impulsive acts have in common the characteristic of proceeding from single motives, or from complexes of motives which have fused together and operate as a single unequivocal impulse. They differ in the fact that in voluntary acts the decisive motive has risen to predominance from among a number of simultaneous and antagonistic motives. When a clearly perceptible conflict between these antagonistic motives precedes the act, we call the volition by the particular name selective act, and the process preceding it we call a choice. The predominance of one motive over other simultaneous motives can be understood only when we presuppose such a conflict in every case. But we are conscious of this conflict sometimes clearly, sometimes only vaguely. It is only in those cases in which we are clearly conscious of the conflict that we speak of choice in the narrower sense of the word. The difference between a voluntary activity and a choice activity is therefore a vanishing quantity. We may say, however, that the ordinary voluntary process is one in which the psychological condition approaches in character impulsive activity, while in choice the difference between impulsive activity and the higher mode of behavior is always clear. We can represent these different relations, which appear at different stages of voluntary development, most obviously through some such schematic diagram as that in Fig. 21. In this diagram the large circles represent in each case the total field of consciousness, while the small circles with in the large ones indicate an idea with a feeling tone which serves as the motive. The small circle which lies in the middle represents the decisive motive. Diagram A represents an impulsive activity, B a voluntary activity, and C a choice activity. In C alone the conflict of motives is represented. This is shown in the figure in the arrows which extend between the circles and the central point and represent the conflict of motives.

7. The psychical process immediately preceding the act, in which process the final motive suddenly gains the ascendency, is called in the case of voluntary acts resolution, in the case of selective acts decision. The first word indicates merely that action is to be carried out in accordance with some consciously adopted motive; the second implies that several courses of action have been presented as possible and that a choice has finally been made.

In contrast to the first stages of a volition, which can not be clearly distinguished from an ordinary emotional process, the last stages of volition are absolutely characteristic. They are especially marked by accompanying feelings which never appear anywhere but in volitions, and must therefore be regarded as the specific elements peculiar to volition. These feelings are first of all feelings of resolution and feelings of decision. Feelings of decision differ from feelings of resolution only in the fact that the former are more intense. They are both exciting and relaxing feelings, and may be united under various circumstances with pleasurable or unpleasurable factors. The relatively greater intensity of the feeling of decision is probably due to its contrast with the preceding feeling of doubt which attends the wavering between different motives. The opposition between doubt and decision gives the feeling of relaxation a greater intensity. At the moment when the volitional act begins, the feelings of resolution give place to the specific feeling of activity, which has its sensation substratum, in the case of external volitional acts, in the sensations of tension accompanying the movement. This feeling of activity is clearly exciting in its character, and may, according to the special motives of the volition, be accompanied now by pleasurable, now by unpleasurable elements, which may in turn vary in the course of the act and alternate with one another. As a total feeling, this feeling of activity is a rising and falling temporal process extending through the whole act and finally passing into the widely differing feelings, such as those of fulfilment, satisfaction, or disappointment, or into the feelings and emotions connected with the special result of the act. Taking the process as seen in voluntary and selective acts as complete volitional acts, the essential reason for distinguishing impulsive acts from complete volitional acts is to be found in the absence of the antecedent feelings of resolution and decision. The feeling connected with the motive passes in the case of impulsive acts directly into the feeling of activity, and then into the feelings which correspond to the effect of the act.

8. The transition from simple to complex volitional acts brings with it a number of other changes which are of great importance for the development of will. The first of these changes is to be found in the fact that the emotions which introduce volitions lose their intensity more and more, as a result of the counteraction of different mutually inhibiting feelings, so that finally a volitional act may result from an apparently unemotional affective state. To be sure, emotion is never entirely wanting; in order that the motive which arises in an ordinary train of feelings may bring about a resolution or decision, it must always be connected with some degree of emotional excitement. The emotional excitement can, however, be so weak and transient that we overlook it. We do this the more easily the more we are inclined to unite in the single idea of the volition both the short emotion which merely attends the rise and action of the motive, and the resolution and execution which constitute the act itself. This weakening of the emotions results mainly from the combinations of psychical processes which we call intellectual development and of which we shall treat more fully in the discussion of the interconnection of psychical compounds (§ 17). Intellectual processes can, indeed, never do away with emotions; such processes are, on the contrary, in many cases the sources of new and characteristic emotions. A volition entirely without emotion, determined by a purely intellectual motive, is, as already remarked (p. 207), a psychological impossibility. Still, intellectual development exercises beyond a doubt a moderating influence on emotions. This is particularly true whenever intellectual motives enter into the emotions which prepare the way for volitional acts. This may be due partly to the counteraction of the feelings which generally takes place, or it may be due partly to the slow development of intellectual motives, for emotions usually are the stronger, the more rapidly their component feelings rise.

9. Connected with this moderation of the emotional components of volitions under the influence of intellectual motives, is still another change. It consists in the fact that the act which closes the volition is not an external movement. The effect which removes the exciting emotion is itself a psychical process which does not show itself directly through any external symptom whatever. Such an effect which is imperceptible for objective observation is called an internal volitional act. The transition from external to internal volitional acts is so bound up with intellectual development that the very character of the intellectual processes themselves is to be explained to a great extent by the influence of volitions on the train of ideas (§ 15, 9). The act which closes the volition in such a case is some change in the train of ideas, which change follows the preceding motives as the result of some resolution or decision. The feelings which accompany these acts of immediate preparation, and the feeling of activity connected with the change itself, agree entirely with the feelings observed in the case of external volitional acts. Furthermore, action is followed by more or less intense feelings of satisfaction, and a removal of preceding emotional and affective strain. The only difference, accordingly, between these special volitions connected with the intellectual development and the earlier forms of volition, is to be found in the fact that here the final effect of the volition does not show itself in an external bodily movement.

Still, we may have a bodily movement as the secondary result of an internal volitional act, when the resolution refers to an external act to be executed at some later time. In such a case the act itself always results from a second, later volition. The decisive motives for this second process come, to be sure, from the preceding internal volition, but the two are nevertheless distinct and different processes. Thus, for example, the formation of a resolution to execute an act in the future under certain expected conditions, is an internal volition, while the later performance of the act is an external action different from the first, even though requiring the first as a necessary antecedent. It is evident that where an external volitional act arises from a decision after a conflict among the motives, we have a transitional form in which it is impossible to distinguish clearly between the two kinds of volition, namely, that which consists in a single unitary process and that which is made up of two processes, that is, of an earlier and a later volition. In such a transitional form, if the decision is at all separated in time from the act itself, the decision may be regarded as an internal volitional act preparatory to the execution.

10. These two changes which take place during the development of will, namely, the moderation of emotions and the rendering independent of internal volitions, are changes of a progressive order. In contrast with these there is a third process which is one of retrogradation. When complex volitions with the same motive are often repeated, the conflict between the motives grows less intense; the opposing motives which were overcome in earlier cases grow weaker and finally disappear entirely. The complex act has then passed into a simple, or impulsive act. This retrogradation of complex volitional processes shows clearly the utter inappropriateness of the limitation of the concept "impulsive" to acts of will arising from sense-feelings. As a result of the gradual elimination of opposing motives, there are intellectual, moral, and aesthetic, as well as simple sensuous, impulsive acts.

This regressive development is but one step in a process which unites all the external acts of living being, whether they are volitional acts or automatic reflex movements. When the habituating practice of certain acts is carried further, the determining motives finally become, even in impulsive acts, weaker and more transient. The external stimulus originally aroused a strongly affective idea which operated as a motive, but now the stimulus causes the discharge of the act before it can arouse an idea. In this way the impulsive movement finally becomes an automatic movement. The more often this automatic movement is repeated, the easier it, in turn, becomes, even when the stimulus is not sensed, as for example in deep sleep or during complete diversion of the attention. The movement now appears as a pure physiological reflex, and the volitional process has become a simple reflex process.

This gradual reduction of volitional to mechanical processes, which depends essentially on the elimination of all the psychical elements between the beginning and end of the act, may take place either in the case of movements which were originally impulsive, or in the case of movements which have become impulsive through the retrogradation of voluntary acts. It is not improbable that all the reflex movements of both animals and men originate in this way. As evidence of this we have, besides the above described reduction of volitional acts through practice to pure mechanical processes, also the purposeful character of reflexes, which points to the presence at some time of purposive ideas as motives. Furthermore, the fact that the movements of the lowest animals are all evidently simple volitional acts, not reflexes, tells for the same view, so that here too there is no justification for the assumption frequently made that acts of will have been developed from reflex movements. Finally, we can most easily explain from this point of view the fact mentioned in § 13 (p. 191), namely, that expressive movements may belong to any one of the forms possible in the scale of external acts. Obviously the simplest movements are impulsive acts, while many complicated pantomimetic movements probably came originally from voluntary acts which passed first into impulsive and then into reflex movements. Observed phenomena make it necessary to assume that the retrogradations which begin in the individual life are gradually carried further through the transmission of acquired dispositions, so that certain acts which were originally voluntary may appear from the first in later descendants as impulsive or reflex movements (§ 19 and § 20).

10a. For reasons similar to those given in the case of emotions, the observation of volitional processes which come into experience by chance, is an inadequate and easily misleading method for establishing the actual facts in the case. Wherever internal or external volitional acts are performed in meeting either the theoretical or practical demands of life, our interest is too much taken up in the action itself to allow us at the same time to observe with exactness the psychical processes which are going on. In the theories of volition given by older psychologists — theories which very often cast their shadows in the science of to-day — we have a clear exhibition of the undeveloped state of the methods of psychological observation. External acts of will are the only ones in the whole sphere of volitional processes which force themselves emphatically on the attention of the observer. As a result the tendency was to limit the concept will to external volitional acts, and thus not only to neglect entirely the whole sphere so important for the higher development of will, namely, internal volitional acts, but also to pay very little attention to the components of the volition which are antecedent to the external acts, or at most to pay attention only to the more striking ideational components of the motive. It followed that the close genetic interconnection between impulsive and voluntary acts was not observed, and that the former were regarded as not belonging to will, but as closely related to reflexes. Will was thus limited to the voluntary and selective actions. Furthermore, the one-sided consideration of the ideational components of the motives led to a complete neglect of the development of volitional acts from emotions, and the singular idea found acceptance that volitional acts are not the products of antecedent motives and of psychical conditions which act upon these motives and bring one of them into the ascendency, but that volition is a process apart from the motives and independent of them, a product of a metaphysical volitional faculty. This faculty was, on the ground of the limitation of the concept volition to voluntary acts, even defined as the choosing faculty of the mind, or as the faculty for preferring one from among the various motives that influence the mind. Thus, instead of deriving volition from its antecedent psychical conditions, only the final result, namely, the volitional act, was used to build up a general concept which was called will, and this class-concept was treated in accordance with the faculty-theory as a first cause from which all concrete volitional acts arise.

It was only a modification of this abstract theory when schopenhauer and, following him, many modern psychologists and philosophers declared that volition in itself is an "unconscious" occurrence which comes to consciousness only in its result, the volitional act. In this case, obviously, the inadequate observation of the volitional process preceding the act, has led to the assumption that no such process exists. Here, again, the whole variety of concrete volitional processes is supplanted by the concept of a single unconscious will, and the result for psychology is the same as before: in place of a comprehension of real psychical processes and their combination, an abstract concept is set up and then erroneously looked upon as a general cause.

Modern psychology and even experimental psychology is still to a great extent under the control of this deep-rooted abstract doctrine of will. In denying from the first the possibility of explaining an act by the concrete psychical causality of the antecedent volitional process, this theory leaves as the only characteristic of an act of will the sum of the sensations which accompany the external act, or may, in cases where the act has often been repeated, immediately precede the act as pale memory-images. The physical excitations in the nervous system are regarded as the causes of the act. Here, then, the question of the causality is taken out of psychology and given over to physiology instead of to metaphysics, as in the theory discussed before. In reality, however, it is here too lost in metaphysics in attempting to cross to physiology. For physiology must, as an empirical science, abandon the attempt to give a complete causal explanation of the physical processes accompanying a complex volitional act from the antecedents of these processes, not only for the present, but for all time, because this problem can be solved only by reference to an endless series of conditions. The only possible basis for such a theory is, therefore, the principle of materialistic metaphysics, that the so-called material processes are all that make up the reality of things and that psychical processes can be explained only from material processes. It is an indispensable principle of empirical psychology that it shall investigate the facts of psychical processes as they are presented in immediate experience, and that it shall not examine their interconnections from points of view which are entirely foreign to the facts themselves (§ 1 and p. 18 sq.). It is impossible to find out how a volition proceeds, in any way other than by following it exactly as it is presented to us in immediate experience. In this experience, however, volition is not presented as an abstract concept, but as concrete single volitions. Of any particular volition, too, we know nothing except what is immediately perceptible in the process. We can know nothing of an unconscious or, what amounts to the same thing for psychology, a material process which is not immediately perceived but merely assumed hypothetically on the basis of metaphysical presuppositions. Such metaphysical assumptions are obviously mere devices to cover up an incomplete or entirely wanting psychological observation.
 
 

References. Review of the chief Theories of Volition: Volkmann, Lehrbuch der Psychologie, vol. II, § 147 (Herbartian Intellectualism). Baumann, Handbuch der Moral, 1879, and Philos. Monatshefte, vol. 17 (ordinary view). Münsterberg, Die Willenshandlung, 1888 (psycho-physical materialism). In opposition to all these theories see Wundt, Phil. Stud., vols. 1 and 6; Ethics (Eng. Translation) vol. II, Pt. Ill, Chap. 1; Lectures, lectures 14 and 15; Grundz. 5th ed., vol. Ill, Chap. 17.
 

11. The exact observation of volitional processes is, for the reasons given above, impossible in the case of volitional acts which come naturally in the course of life; the only way in which a thorough psychological investigation can be made, is, therefore, through experimental observation. To be sure, we can not produce volitional processes of every kind whenever we wish to do so, we must limit ourselves therefore to the observation of such processes as can be easily influenced through external means, namely such as begin with external stimulations and terminate in external acts. The experiments which serve this purpose are called reaction experiments. They may be described in their essentials as follows. A volitional process of simple or complex character is incited by an external sense-stimulus and then after the occurrence of certain psychical processes which serve in part as motives, the volition is brought to an end by a motor reaction. Reaction experiments have a second and more general significance in addition to their significance as means for the analysis of volitional processes. They furnish means for the measurement of the rate of certain psychical and psycho-physical processes.

The simplest reaction experiment that can be tried is as follows. At the end of a short but always uniform interval (2—3 sec.) after a signal which serves to concentrate the attention has been given, an external stimulus is allowed to act on some sense-organ. At the moment when the stimulus is perceived, a movement which has been determined upon and prepared before, as, for example, a movement of the hand, is executed. The psychological conditions in this experiment correspond essentially to those of a simple volition. The sense impression serves as a simple motive, and this is to be followed invariably by a particular act. If now we measure objectively by means of either graphic or other chronometric apparatus, the interval which elapses between the action of the stimulus and the execution of the movement, it will be possible, by frequently repeated experiments of the same kind, to become thoroughly acquainted with the subjective processes which make up the whole reaction, while at the same time the results of the objective measurement will furnish a check for the constancy or possible variations in these subjective processes. This check is especially useful in those cases where some condition in the experiment, and thereby the subjective course of the volition itself, is intentionally modified.

12. Such a modification may, indeed, be introduced even in the simple form of the experiment just described, by varying the way in which the reactor prepares, before the appearance of the stimulus, for the execution of the act. When the preparation is of such a character that expectation is directed toward the stimulus which is to serve as a motive, and the external act does not take place until the stimulus is clearly recognized, there results a complete or sensorial form of reaction. When, on the other hand, the preparatory expectation is so directed toward the act, that the movement follows the reception of the stimulus as rapidly as possible, there results a shortened form of reaction, or the so-called muscular reaction. In the first case the ideational factor of the expectation is a pale memory image of the familiar sense impression. When the period of preparation is more extended, this image oscillates between alternating clearness and obscurity. The affective element is a feeling of expectation which oscillates in a similar manner and is connected with sensations of strain from the sense-organ to be affected, as for example with tension of the tympanic membrane, or of the ocular muscles of accommodation and movement. At the moment when the impression arrives the preparatory feelings and sensations mentioned are followed by a comparatively weak relieving feeling of surprise. This surprise in turn gives place to a clearly subsequent arousing feeling of activity which accompanies the reaction movement and appears in conjunction with the inner tactual sensations. In the second case, on the other hand, where the reaction is of the shortened form, we may observe during the period of preparatory expectation a pale, wavering memory image of the motor organ which is to react (e. g., the hand) together with strong sensations of strain in the same, and a fairly continuous feeling of expectation connected with these sensations. At the moment when the stimulus arrives the state of expectation gives place to a strong feeling of surprise. There connect with this surprise both the feeling of activity which accompanies the reaction and also the sensations which arise in the reaction. So rapid is this connection that the surprise and the subsequent state are not distinguished at all, or at most only very vaguely. The sensorial reaction-time is on the average 0.210—0.290 sec.; muscular reaction-time averages from 0.100—0.180 sec. (the shortest time is for sound, the longest for light). ¹⁾

1) Complete and shortened forms of reaction are further distinguished by the characteristic fact that in long series of these two classes of reactions no early reactions or mistaken reactions appear among the complete reactions, while they are very frequent among the shortened reactions. Both early reactions and mistaken reactions may be observed when the true stimulus is, in frequently repeated experiments, preceded at a uniform interval by a preparatory signal. An early reaction is one in which the reactor moves his hand before the arrival of the signal agreed upon. A mistaken reaction is one in which the reactor moves in response to some accidental sensory stimulus. The reaction-times for sensations of taste, smell, temperature, and pain are not included in the figures given. They are all longer. The differences are, however, obviously to be attributed to purely physiological conditions (slow transmission of the stimulation to the nerve-endings, and in the case of pain slower central conduction), so that they are of no very great interest for psychology.

13. By introducing special conditions we may make complete and shortened reactions the starting points for the study of the development of volitions in two different directions. Complete (sensorial) reactions furnish the means of passing from simple to complex volitions because we can in this case easily insert different psychical processes between the perception of the impression and the execution of the reaction. Thus we have a voluntary act of relatively simple character when we allow an act of direct sensory cognition and discrimination to follow the perception of the impression and then let the movement depend on this second process. In this case, not the immediate impression, but the idea which results from the act of cognition or discrimination is the motive for the act to be performed. This motive is only one of a greater or smaller number of equally possible motives which could have come up in place of it; as a result the reaction movement takes on the character of a voluntary act. In fact, we may observe clearly the feeling of resolution antecedent to the act and also the feelings preceding the feeling of resolution and connected with the perception of the impression. This is still more emphatically the case, and the succession of ideational and affective processes is at the same time more complicated, when we bring in still another psychical process, as for example memory processes, to serve as the motive for the execution of the movement. Finally, the voluntary process becomes one of choice when in such experiments the act is not merely influenced by a plurality of motives in such a way that several must follow one another before one determines the act, but when, in addition to that, one of a number of possible different acts is decided upon according to the motive presented. This kind of reaction takes place when preparations are made for different movements, for example one with the right hand another with the left hand, or one with each of the ten fingers, and the condition is prescribed for each movement that an impression of a particular quality shall serve as its motive, for example the impression blue for the right hand, red for the left.

14. Shortened (muscular) reactions, on the contrary, may be used to investigate the retrogradation of volitional acts as they become reflex movements. In this form of reaction the preparatory expectation is directed entirely toward the external act which is to be executed as rapidly as possible, so that voluntary inhibition or execution of the act in accordance with the special character of the impression can here not take place. In other words, a transition from simple to complex acts of will, is in this case impossible. On the other hand, it is easy by practice so to habituate one's self to the invariable connection of an impression and a particular movement, that the process of perception fades out more and more or takes place after the motor impulse, so that finally the movement becomes just like a reflex movement. This reduction of volition to a mechanical process, shows itself objectively most clearly in the shortening of the objective time to that observed for pure reflexes, and shows itself subjectively in the fact that for psychological observation there is a complete coincidence in point of time, of impression and reaction, while the characteristic feeling of resolution gradually disappears entirely.

14a. The chronometric experiments familiar in experimental psychology under the name of "reaction experiments", are important for two reasons: first, as aids in the analysis of volitional processes, and second, as means for the investigation of the temporal course of psychical processes in general. This twofold importance of reaction experiments reflects the central importance of volitions. On the one hand, the simpler processes, such as feelings, emotions, and their related ideas, are components of a complete volition; on the other, all possible forms of the interconnection of psychical compounds may appear as components of a volition. Volitional processes are, consequently, appropriate subjects to form the links between what has gone before and the topic to be discussed in the next chapter, namely, the interconnection between psychical compounds.

For a "reaction experiment" which is to be the basis of an analysis of a volitional process or any of its component psychical processes, we must have first of all exact and sufficiently fine (reading with exactness to ¹/₁₀₀₀ sec.) chronometric apparatus (electric clock or graphic register). The apparatus must be so arranged that we can determine exactly the moment at which the stimulus acts and that at which the subject reacts. This can be accomplished by allowing the stimulus itself (sound, light, or tactual stimulus), to close an electric current which sets an electric clock, reading to ¹/₁₀₀₀ sec., in motion, and then allowing the observer, by means of a simple movement of the hand which raises a telegraph-key, to break the current again at the moment when he perceives the stimulus. This experiment can be carried out by allowing a tuning-fork to trace its vibrations upon a rapidly rotating cylinder which moves at a uniform rate. (SS' Fig. 22). At the same time two levers controlled by electromagnets are allowed to trace directly under the tuning-fork. One of these levers records the instant at which the stimulus for the reaction is given, the other the instant at which the reaction movement is made. These records are produced by opening the electric circuits which pass through the electromagnets controlling the levers. The result of this arrangement is that there are two lines EE' and RR' with records of movements directly under the tuning-fork line SS'. The movements in these two lines, as represented at a and c, indicate respectively the moment of stimulation and the moment of reaction. The time between a and c can easily be measured in terms of the vibrations of the tuning-fork from b to d. If a large number of such reaction experiments are to be carried out, the apparatus commonly employed and found to be more advantageous consists in an electric clock which registers directly. The dial of this clock indicates thousandths of a second and is so arranged that it begins to move at the moment the stimulus is given and stops moving the moment the reaction takes place. In this way we may measure simple reactions varied in different ways (complete and shortened reactions, reactions with or without preceding signals), or we may bring into the process various other psychical acts (discriminations, cognitions, simple associations, selective processes) which may be regarded either as motives for the volition or as components of the general interconnection of psychical compounds. A simple reaction always includes, along with the volitional process, purely physiological factors (conduction of the sensory excitation to the brain and of the motor excitation to the muscle). If, now, we insert further psychical processes (discriminations, cognitions, associations, acts of choice), a modification which can be made only when complete reactions are employed, the duration of clearly definable psychical processes may be worked out by subtracting the interval found for simple reactions from those found for the compound reactions. In this way it has been determined that the time required for the cognition and for the discrimination of relatively simple impressions (colors, letters, short words) is 0.03—0.05 sec.; the time of memory processes is 0.3—0.8 sec. The time for choice between two movements (right and left hand) is 0.06 sec., between ten movements (the ten fingers) 0.4 sec., etc. As already remarked the value of these figures is not their absolute magnitude, but rather their utility as checks for introspection. Furthermore, we may, by means of these experiments, apply introspective observation to processes subject to conditions which are prescribed with exactness and which may therefore be repeated at pleasure. One must not lose sight of the fact that as the reaction processes become more and more complex, the figures given can be less and less definitely assigned to special clearly differentiated psychical processes. Thus, a choice process or an association process is composed of a great number of elementary processes which in different individual cases are combined in different ways and appear in different degrees of completeness. The result is that the average time found by trying a large number of experiments gives a certain relative measure of the complexity of the processes, but no absolute indication of the duration of any single definitely distinguishable psychical phenomenon. In general it is to be noted that reaction experiments are among the most difficult forms of investigation in experimental psychology, if they are to be conducted in such a way as to have any value for psychology. They require the greatest technical care, the collection and statistical treatment of a large number of observations; and they require also the highest degree of practice in introspection. Unfortunately, these conditions are not met in all cases. Sometimes far reaching conclusions in regard to the nature of psychical processes are based upon a few cursory observations. Sometimes the reaction method is applied without any hesitation to the most complex psychical processes, to complex associations and to judgments which are to be carried out under definite logical conditions. Such experiments are worthless because the conditions are too complex to permit of a psychological interpretation of the results and because introspection is rendered impossible by the demand which is made in such complex cases for reflective thought. Thus, reflective thought is demanded in judgment reactions so-called, in order to think out a suitable concept with which to complete the judgment. For such judgments there is sometimes required a broad general concept, sometimes a coordinate concept, or finally a contrasting concept. Complex mental processes such as those involved in logical thought of this kind, in artistic creation, and in myth-building imagination, are quite inaccessible to investigation by the experimental method, which from its very nature is applicable only to the analysis of simple mental processes. The problems which experiment can not properly investigate can be taken up by social-psychology which deals with such problems as the evolution of language, myths and customs.

14b. There are many psychologists who regard the difference between sensorial and muscular reactions not as generally valid differences common to all persons and due to more or less complete modes of execution of the volitional process; they look upon sensorial and muscular reactions rather as individual differences, as so-called typical differences in the rapidity of the execution of reaction movement. That their view is incorrect is clearly shown when (1) experiments are systematically carried out in great numbers and with trained subjects, and when (2) the results are interpreted by the use of the frequency curve, which is always to be recommended in evaluating results from experiments which deal with facts subject to wide individual variations. Let a number of experiments, say from 500 to 1,000, which have been carried out under similar circumstances, be brought together in a single frequency curve. Let the absissa line, (XX' Fig. 23), be marked off into time-units which are appropriate to the results obtained by the experiment. For example, let each unit on the absissa line represent 0.004 sec. Let the ordinates represent the number of cases in which the reactions have a duration corresponding to the time represented at a given point on the absissa. First, let a curve of this kind be plotted for an observer who performs a series of simple reactions without any special directions as to how he shall perform his reactions, A curve of the form represented by the line NN' in the figure will result. Now let the reactor be put through a practice series in which the greatest possible rapidity of reaction is developed, and it will be found that the results obtained after a long period of practice give a curve of the form M, which differs from the original curve NN' in that it has only one crest. Again, let the reactor be trained in the opposite direction, that is, so that he reacts only after the sense impression has been clearly apprehended; the results of this second practice series will give a curve with a single crest, but that crest will be, as indicated by S in the figure, in a position different from that of the curve M. The two curves M and S make it clear that the original double curve NN' is composed of a number of very different types of results, some of which, constituting the curve N, approximate the muscular reaction, others, appearing in N', are sensorial reactions, while there is a smaller number of intermediate cases which lie between the two extremes. Practice in one direction gives pure muscular reactions which are essentially reflex in type and appear in the group indicated by the curve M. Practice in the opposite direction gives purely sensorial reactions represented by S. All of the complex reactions-times which involve the addition of certain psychic processes must be related to this second or sensorial type of reaction represented in N' and S. It becomes clear from such considerations as these that the ordinary methods of reaction-time experiments, according to which an observer is allowed to react as he pleases and according to which an average is taken of all of the resultant reactions, can not be relied upon to give an exact result. The average obtained by bringing together all of the results represented in the general curve NN' would be represented by the line m in the figure. This average represented by m does not correspond to either one of the reaction values, but serves merely to cover up completely the psychological differences which are clearly expressed in the full curve. If the experiments are carried out on a great number of persons, there are, to be sure, individual differences. These consist, however, merely in the fact that in one case the crest N is higher and in other cases the crest N' is higher. The differences consist, therefore, merely in individual tendencies of greater or less degree toward the complete or the shortened reaction, and these individual tendencies can in all cases be overcome through systematic training.
 
 

References. Donders, Archiv f. Anat. u. Physiol. 1868 (the first attempt to work out the value of reaction experiments for psychology). Exner, Pflüger's Archiv, vol. 7. Wundt, Phil. Stud., vol. 1 (on psychological methods). Merkel, same, vol. 2. cattell, same, vols. 3 and 4. L. Lange, same, vol. 4. alechsieff, same, vol. 16. bergemann, Psychol. Stud., vol. 1. Kraepelin, Ueber die Beeinflussung einfacher psychischer Vorgänge durch einige Arzneimittel, 1892. Wundt, Grundz. 5th ed., vol. III, Chap. 17; Lectures, lecture 18.